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Change blindness—our inability to detect changes in a stimulus—occurs even when the 
change takes place gradually, without any disruption (Simons et al., 2000). Such gradual 
changes are more difficult to detect than changes that involve a disruption. Using this 
method, David et al. (in press) recently showed substantial blindness to changes that 
involve facial expressions of emotion. In this experiment, we show that people who failed 
to detect any change in the displays were (1) nevertheless influenced by the changing 
information in subsequent recognition decisions about which facial expression they had 
seen, and (2) that their confidence in their decisions was lower after exposure to changing 
vs. static displays. The findings therefore support the notion that undetected changes that 
occur in highly salient stimuli may be causally efficacious and influence subsequent 
behaviour. Implications concerning the nature of the representations associated with 





Change blindness, our inability to detect large changes in visual displays, is a 
striking phenomenon that has now been demonstrated through various paradigms (e.g. 
Rensink, 2002; Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 2000; Rensink, ORegan, & Clark, 1997; 
Simons, 2000; Simons & Levin, 1998; Simons & Levin, 2003).  
 
While early empirical work in this domain was characterized by the use of highly 
artificial stimuli consisting of dot matrices (Phillips, 1974) or letter arrays (Pashler, 
1988), more recent demonstrations involve changes that occur in complex, realistic 
scenes (Rensink et al., 2000; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons, Franconeri, & Reimer, 2000; 
Velichkovsky, Dornhoefer, Kopf, Helmert, & Joos, 2002). Change blindness challenges 
introspective judgments that our perception of the world is complete and accurate—a 
belief so strongly held that it has been dubbed “change blindness blindness” (Levin, 
Momen, Drivdahl, & Simons, 2000). For instance, in real life situations, observers fail to 
notice changes as dramatic as switching an individual with whom they are interacting to a 
different person (Levin & Simons, 1997). Moreover, observers continue to exhibit change 
blindness even when directly instructed to detect changes (Rensink et al., 2000; Rensink 
et al., 1997; Simons et al., 2000). Numerous relevant studies have used the so-called 
“flicker” paradigm, in which two images, identical to each other but for a single change, 
are displayed alternatively for 240ms and separated from each other by a 80ms blank 
screen—the disruption. This flickering sequence is typically repeated until the observer 
detects the change. It can take many such cycles (up to hundreds in some conditions) for 
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observers to become aware of the change (Rensink et al., 1997). Rensink et al. (1997) 
have documented that detection rate is influenced by the location at which the change 
occurs. For instance, performance improves when the change involves an area of major 
interest compared to an area of marginal interest.  
 
In such flicker studies (Rensink et al., 2000; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons et al., 
2000), change blindness is induced by a brief visual disruption inserted between the two 
target images, and hence the demonstration is perhaps less compelling than it might first 
appear because the images only appear for a brief duration. “Gradual change” studies 
address this limitation by introducing changes only very progressively (e.g., over a period 
of 12 seconds), without any disruption. With this method, observers have the opportunity 
to look at the image carefully1 and in an uninterrupted manner. Studies using this 
paradigm have explored people’s ability to detect changes in object color or changes 
involving the deletion or addition of an object. Simons et al. (2000) showed that gradual 
change produces powerful change blindness despite the fact that the change is 
continuously happening in front of the observer. However, change blindness rate was 
lower under gradual change conditions than under disruption conditions for changes 
involving deletion or addition. However, as Simons et al. (2000) pointed out, this result 
might be due to artifacts. Indeed, gradual changes, when they involve deletion or 
addition, necessarily produce intermediate frames that contain easily noticed artifacts, 
such as transparent objects (Simons et al., 2000). In a second experiment that avoided 
such artifacts by using color changes, Simons et al. (2000) showed that change blindness 
                                                
1 Note that Hollingworth used long pre-change display presentation (up to 20 sec) to address this limitation 
(Hollingworth, 2003, 2004) 
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rate was higher for gradual changes than for disruption changes (see also Auvray & 
O'Regan, 2003 for similar conclusions). 
 
In this light, David, Laloyaux, Devue and Cleeremans (in press)2 investigated 
gradual changes with facial expressions of emotions because expression changes involve 
essentially modifications to the shape and spatial relationships of features that are internal 
to an object rather than the appearance or disappearance of new objects. They showed 
that such changes still produce quite substantial rates of change blindness, as only about 
15% of participants detected slow, gradual changes in the facial expression of actors, 
even when such changes occur in front of their eyes as they intentionally scrutinize the 
stimuli under direct instructions to detect any changes. 
 
These and other findings leave open an important question, however: What is 
represented, if anything, when a change remains undetected? Authors have suggested 
several explanations (see, Simons, 2000, for a review). A first possibility is that there is a 
failure to encode or represent the pre-change and/or post-change information (O'Regan & 
Noe, 2001). This absence of visual representation would explain change blindness 
because comparison with the post-change information is then be impossible. Another 
possibility is that the representation of the pre-change information is erased or 
overwritten by the post-change information (Beck & Levin, 2003; Becker, Pashler, & 
Anstis, 2000; Landman, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2003; Tatler, 2001). Other authors have 
suggested that it is also possible that while information about both pre- and post-change 
                                                
2 An example stimulus is available at the following URL: http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/DemoLaloyauxetal.mov 
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states is stored in some manner, the comparison between the two representations fails, 
which would likewise produce change blindness (Angelone, Levin, & Simons, 2003; 
Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; Mitroff, Simons, & Levin, 2004; Scott-Brown, Baker, 
& Orbach, 2000; Silverman & Mack, 2006; Simons, Chabris, Schnur, & Levin, 2002). In 
this latter case, the problem is thus not about representations, but rather about an 
operation that has to be performed on them.  
 
Simons (2000) usefully summarized 5 alternatives as follows: (1) “Overwriting”, 
which means that pre-change representation would be erased by post-change 
representation (Beck & Levin, 2003; Becker et al., 2000; Landman et al., 2003; Tatler, 
2001), (2) “First impression”, which suggests that it would only be the pre-change 
representation that is represented and not what is presented after the change. This account 
makes it difficult, however, to explain why the visual system would stop forming 
representations when a change is displayed, as representations are updated with time 
(Hollingworth & Henderson, 2004), (3) “Nothing is stored” is a position defended by 
O’Regan and Noë (2001), and which posits that no visual representation should be 
postulated to perceive the world. (4) “Everything is stored but nothing is compared” 
assumes that some representation is formed both for the pre-change and the post-change 
display but that no comparison is made between both representations when change 
blindness occurs. As noted earlier, much recent evidence suggests that this possibility 
might explain some change blindness cases (Angelone et al., 2003; Hollingworth & 
Henderson, 2002; Mitroff et al., 2004; Scott-Brown et al., 2000; Silverman & Mack, 
2006; Simons et al., 2002). Finally, (5) “Feature combination” suggests that an integrated 
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representation would be formed based on both pre- and post-change displays, which 
would then make change detection impossible. 
 
Leaving aside for the time being the question of which of these accounts is most 
likely to be correct, the question of whether undetected changes are represented somehow 
was directly addressed in a convincing study by Mitroff et al. (2004), who showed that 
observers remain capable of recognizing, in a forced-choice task, both the pre and post-
change information, even when reporting being unaware of having detected a change. In 
that study, observers were exposed to changes in a classic change detection paradigm 
(Phillips, 1974) in which 4 to 8 objects were displayed on a computer screen. On most 
trials, one of the objects changed into another object. Right after the change detection 
trial, a series of subsequent two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) trials was administered 
in random order. One 2AFC trial presented the pre-change object along with a random 
novel object that had not been presented in the trial, and participants were asked to 
choose which had been presented. Another 2AFC trial presented the post-change object 
along with a random novel object. A third 2ACF trial presented a random presented non-
changing object along with a novel object. Observers were asked to report if they had 
detected the change after (Experiments 1-3) or before (Experiment 4) the series of 2AFC 
trials. Through this design, Mitroff et al. showed that even when subjects were unaware 
of the change, they were nevertheless able to remember, better than expected by chance, 
both the pre- and post-change information. 
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 However, the question of determining what representation observers form of the 
material when exposed to changing stimuli that contain more than two images has never 
been explored directly. When only two images (i.e., the pre- and the post-change 
displays) are presented, as in the flicker paradigm, subjects may remember the pre-
change display, the post-change display, or both, as shown by Mitroff et al. But what is 
remembered when many intermediate images are presented, as in the gradual change 
paradigm? Do participants remember only the first or the last display? Or do they 
construct some average representation of the entire sequence? These are essentially the 
questions we explored in this study.  
 
Instead of testing every aspect of the representation observers have formed of a 
changing stimulus, which is impractical, we asked what stimulus subjects spontaneously 
select when asked to identify what they had seen among a limited number (i.e., five) of 
perceivably different images. Crucially, in our paradigm, participants were not informed 
that a change may occur, and we focused data analysis on those participants who had 
remained unaware of the fact that some stimuli were changing. This is important for 
previous studies (Angelone et al., 2003; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; Mitroff et al., 
2004; Scott-Brown et al., 2000; Silverman & Mack, 2006; Simons et al., 2002) have 
demonstrated that some information both about pre and post-change displays is stored 
when observers are forewarned that a change may occur  
 
This issue is also related to recent debates about implicit change detection 
(Fernandez-Duque, Grossi, Thornton, & Neville, 2003; Fernandez-Duque & Thornton, 
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2000, 2003; Laloyaux, Destrebecqz, & Cleeremans, 2006; Mitroff, Simons, & 
Franconeri, 2002; Thornton & Fernandez-Duque, 2000, 2002). For instance, Fernandez-
Duque and Thornton (2000) presented their subjects with changes of orientation of 
horizontal and vertical rectangles and showed that, even when subjects reported being 
unaware of a change, they were nevertheless able to localize the change above chance 
level. In a different paradigm, Thornton and Fernandez-Duque (2000) again presented 
their subjects with horizontal and vertical rectangles but showed that exposure to a 
change in the orientation of an item produced a congruency effect in a subsequent 
judgment task about the orientation of a rectangle. Although these studies were criticized 
by Mitroff et al. (2002), it seems that these effects persist even after the correction of 
potential biases (Fernandez-Duque & Thornton, 2003; Laloyaux et al., 2006). It therefore 
seems that a change that observers report as being unaware of can influence subsequent 
behavior.  
 
This question, however, remains open for complex stimuli that involve more than 2 
subsequent brief displays of rectangles. A recent study (Hollingworth & Henderson, 
2004) is relevant in this context. The authors used what could be called a "gradual flicker 
paradigm", wherein a scene was progressively rotated in steps of 1 degree of visual angle 
on each display, with each display separated from the next one by a brief blank screen. 
The results indicated that half of the participants were unaware of the change up to a 
rotation of 48°. However, when a shift (using a blank to avoid low level signal) back to 
the original scene was produced after a cumulated rotation of 20 or 30° that had remained 
undetected, most subjects could then clearly see the change, suggesting the existence that 
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visual memory had been updated unconsciously. This conclusion follows from the fact 
that had visual memory not been udpated at all, subjects would not have been able to 
detect the change when coming back to the original display. 
 
In the present study, we thus explored the same issue, but using a fully continuous 
stimulus, and a different reporting methodology that allows for somewhat stronger 
conclusions. Specifically, in this experiment, we used the subset of stimuli involving 
gradual changes of facial expressions used by David at al. (in press) to investigate what 
representation observers form when exposed to a change while remaining unaware of this 
change. If nothing at all is represented, then one should expect to observe a completely 
flat distribution of recognition choices, that is, observers should choose all of the 
intermediate images equally often. It should be noted that the same prediction can be 
made if “everything is represented”. However, if the distribution of choices differs from 
pure chance, (e.g., if it exhibits a primacy or recency effect, or if some other bias towards 
particular intermediates is apparent), this would suggest unconscious sensitivity to 
change, or at least an update of the representation during the change. It is important to 
realize that finding a distribution of choices that differs from a flat distribution rules out 
both the “nothing is represented” hypothesis and the “everything is equally represented” 
hypothesis. 
Note that the task is prima facie identical for static and for changing stimuli, that is, 
it is just as easy for people to express their choice after having been exposed to a 
changing or to a static stimulus, given that we only considered participants who had 
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remained unaware of the changes. In other words, all participants whose results we 
analyze below think that they had been exposed to static, photographic stimuli. 
 
To summarize, in this experiment, we used the subset of stimuli involving gradual 
changes of facial expressions used by David at al. (in press) to investigate what 




Subjects. 49 undergraduate students from the Université Libre de Bruxelles 
participated either for partial class credit or for 4 Euros.  
 
Materials. The material was composed of the 8 stimuli involving facial expression 
changes used in David et al. (in press). David et al. used 8 different scenes composed of 3 
actors (three different actors for each scene) showing various facial expressions and 
placed in different locations. The scenes were either static, or they contained a facial 
expression change based on two different snapshots (see Fig. 1 for an example). The 
modified facial expression was “pasted” carefully on the original scene. Using morphing 
software (Morph Man 2000), 144 intermediate frames for each AB pair were then created 
and assembled in a 12s QuickTime movie. Facial expression changes represented an 
average of 4.2% of the total surface of the image. For each pair of images, we created two 
movies, one involving a Neutral (N) to Emotional (E) change, and the second involving 
an E to N change. David et al. showed that such changes were detected only by 15% of 
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participants when explicitly required to detect them under conditions where they were 
also presented with color changes.  
 
Insert Fig. 1 around here 
 
Stimuli were displayed on a 17” CRT screen at a resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels. 
Each scene had a size of 756 by 567 pixels (subtending about 19° by 25° of visual angle) 
and was presented on a gray background. Subjects were tested either individually either 
in groups of up to 8 participants in the same room (in which case each participant was 
isolated from the others in a single box and wearing headphones playing white noise).  
 
In addition, new material was created for the recognition task: for each target face, a 
square was isolated from the whole scene image and resized to an image of 150*150 
pixels, substending 4*4 degrees. Thus, as the size of the target face was different in each 
of the scenes (see David et al.,  for a complete description of the material), a square that 
framed the face was created and this square was isolated from the rest of the image. The 
square was then resized to 150*150 pixels if necessary so that all recognition stimuli 
were identical in size. Moreover, 5 morphs (Figure 2) ranging between an E and N 
expression (0% N – 100% E, 25% N – 75% E, 50% N – 50% E, 75%N – 25% E, 100% N 
– 0% E) were created (again using Morphman 2000) and displayed on the screen aligned 
in a random order during the recognition task. Thus, for each target face, we first took the 
two most extreme faces: E and N. These two were respectively the “0% N – 100% E” 
face and the “100% E - 0% N” face. Next, we created 3 intermediates between these two 
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extreme pictures: one with 25% of emotional facial expression and 75% of neutral facial 
expression “25% N – 75% E”, a second that consisted of an equal mixture of the two 
expressions, “50% N – 50% E”, and finally a third with 75% of emotional facial 
expression and 25% of neutral facial expression “75%N – 25% E”. Thus we ended up 
with 5 stimuli, each depicting facial expressions ranging from E to N and that were 
shown to observers in a random order on the screen.  
 
Procedure. Participants were instructed to memorize the faces “because they 
would be subsequently asked to recognize them by selecting the exact faces observer had 
been exposed to.” Observers were unwittingly exposed to 4 changing stimuli (movies) 
together with 4 non-changing (static) stimuli for 12 s (see Figure 2). Presentation order of 
the 8 stimuli (movie or static) was randomized. The four changing stimuli contained 
gradual changes that occurred over a period of 12 seconds. Half of them contained 
positive emotional expressions and the other half contained negative emotional 
expressions; half began with the Neutral expression and half began with the Emotional 
expression.  
 
Insert Fig. 2 around here 
 
After each presentation, participants were asked to select the image they had been 
exposed to among the 5 morphs described above, and to rate their confidence in their 
decision on a 4-points scale (4 = very high, 3 = high, 2 = low, 1 = very low). At the end 
of the experiment, observers were asked if they had noticed “anything unusual” and 
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“anything that had changed” in the stimuli so as to ascertain whether they were aware of 
the occurrence of changes in some of the stimuli. We asked them 4 questions that became 
more and more explicit about a change. If subjects reported any sense of anything 
“strange” or “unusual”, we considered them as being aware of the change, thus using a 
very conservative criterion.  
 
Results 
Fourteen out of forty-nine participants reported awareness of at least one change. 
They were thus considered “aware” and discarded from the analysis, which thus 
concerned “unaware” participants only. Thus, 35 out of 49 (71.4%) participants failed to 
detect any change and were included in the analysis. 
 
Insert Fig. 3 around here 
 
 
We examined performance on the recognition task by considering the distribution 
of choices as a function of whether the stimulus had been changing or not (see Figure 3). 
While there was a single correct response for the static stimuli, this was not the case for 
the changing stimuli since participants had been exposed to all intermediate images 
between the neutral and the emotional expression in that condition. In both cases 
however, we can compare the observed distribution to the flat distribution that would be 
produced by chance. For the static stimuli, the distribution of responses was different 
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from chance [χ²(4) = 126.29; p < 0.0001]. As expected, most participants (52%) were 
able to correctly choose the image that they had actually been exposed to. For the 
changing stimuli, given that participants had actually been exposed for strictly equivalent 
durations to all morphs, one would expect to observe a flat distribution of choices if 
participants were simply guessing. However, this was not the case: The observed 
distribution differed both from chance [χ²(4) = 18.5; p < 0.001] and from the distribution 
obtained for static stimuli [paired-samples Wilcoxon test, Z(35)= 5.09; p < 0.0001]. The 
mode for the static stimuli was 0-100% while the mode for the changing stimuli was 75-
25%.  
To determine whether subjects tended to choose one stimulus significantly more 
than another in both the static and changing conditions, we conducted Friedman 
ANOVAs. A first analysis was conducted on the static data. It revealed that choices were 
not equally distributed [Friedman test, χ²(n=35, df=4)= 75.43; p<0.00001]. In addition, 
we compared the choices two by two with the mode (0-100%) and found that the 0-100% 
stimulus was chosen significantly more often than the others (all ps<0.05). We also 
conducted a second Friedman ANOVA on the changing data [Friedman test, χ²(n=35, 
df=4)= 17.51; p<0.001], again confirming that choices were not equally distributed. We 
also compared the choices two by two with the mode (75-25%). This only revealed a 
significant difference with the 0-100% choice. Furthermore, we also compared the static 
and changing conditions for each choice. The 100-0% morph was chosen significantly 
more often in the static than in the changing condition. For the 25-75% morph, there was 
a trend (p=0.068) for this morph to be chosen more often in the static than in the 
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changing condition. All the other choices (i.e., 50-50%, 75-25%, and 100-0%) were 
chosen significantly more often (p<0.05) in the changing than in the static condition. 
 
To test for a possible effect of facial expression (emotional vs. neutral) on 
performance, we compared the choices for the neutral (N) stimuli and emotional (E) 
stimuli in the static condition [paired-sample Wilcoxon test, Z(35) = 2.09; p < 0.03]. This 
showed that observers tended to be more accurate when exposed to a static emotionally 
expressive face than when exposed to a neutral face. We also compared stimuli changing 
from Neutral (N) to Emotional (E) to stimuli changing from E to N, but failed to find any 
significant difference [paired-sample Wilcoxon test, Z(35) = 0.04; p = 0.96]. 
 
Insert Fig. 4 around here 
 
 
Finally, participants were significantly less confident in their choices for the 
changing than for the static stimuli [paired-sample Wilcoxon test, Z(35) = 2.34; p < 
0.019] (see Figure 4).  
  
Discussion 
To assess what is represented when one is confronted with an undetected change, 
participants were exposed either to static or gradually changing pictures of faces for 12 
seconds and asked to memorize them. Changes were applied to the emotional expression 
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displayed by one of the actors, going from neutral to emotional for half of the stimuli and 
in the reverse direction for the other half. In a subsequent recognition test that followed 
each trial, participants were then shown 5 intermediate morphed pictures and were (1) 
asked to choose the picture they had just seen, and (2) asked to express their confidence 
in their decision.  
 
A first result showed that quite a high proportion of subjects failed to detect any 
change (71.4%). This is a rather high proportion considering (1) that observers had been 
instructed to focus on the faces of the actors and to memorize them; (2) that facial 
expressions are highly salient stimuli that are socially relevant in all cultures (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971). 
 
Second, the recognition test showed that unaware participants’ choices were 
different from chance, both for static and changing stimuli. Indeed, their responses were 
not equally distributed across the 5 intermediate pictures. This suggests that participants 
had stored information and had formed a representation of the stimuli even when these 
stimuli were changing. Moreover, the pattern of responses was different for the static and 
for the changing stimuli, as indicated by the fact that the modes of the distributions are 
different. This suggests that observers do not report the same representation when 
exposed to static vs. changing stimuli,. More precisely, the pattern of responses 
associated with changing stimuli (the mode for changing stimuli being on the “75-25%” 
morph) suggests a recency rather than a primacy effect since subjects tended to remember 
what they had been exposed to most recently. However, they did not choose the final 
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stimulus either. Two by two comparisons showed that in the case of static stimuli, the 
mode (0-100%) was chosen significantly more often than the other alternatives, while for 
the changing condition, the mode (75-25%) was only significantly different from the 0-
100% alternative. Nonetheless, our results clearly show that there is more of a recency 
than of a primacy effect in the changing condition, and that the distribution of responses 
is not flat. 
 
A third result concerns the effects of emotional expression on participant’s choices. 
In the static condition, participants were more accurate when exposed to a static 
emotionally expressive face than when exposed to a neutral face, while there was no 
difference in choices between stimuli that gradually changed from N to E and from N to 
E in the changing condition. 
 
Finally, we observed a difference in the confidence judgments associated with 
decisions concerning static or changing stimuli. Participants expressed lower confidence 
in their recognition decisions after having been exposed to changing stimuli than to static 
stimuli. This suggests that while unaware that the stimuli were changing, participants 
were nevertheless somewhat aware that “something was off” with those stimuli. This 
indicates that they somehow knew that their representation was less accurate, but were 
not aware that this lack of accuracy was actually attributable to the variation of the 
stimuli themselves. Indeed, observers did not attribute the source of their uncertainty to 
the stimuli, but to their own experience of these stimuli. 
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 This study therefore suggests that an implicit update of visual memory seems to be 
at play when observers are exposed to a gradually changing stimulus. Our data also 
suggest that undetected changes in visual displays can influence both subsequent 
decisions as well as participant’s confidence in these decisions. 
 
 However, it is important to note that an alternative account3 of the distribution 
observed in the changing condition is possible. First, observers might just be guessing 
more in the changing condition than in the static condition because the changing 
condition is inherently more difficult (since all alternatives had in fact been presented). 
This would, without further assumptions, produce a tendency for observers who guess to 
simply choose the average of the choices they are confronted with. Second, observers 
might just remember best what they have been exposed to last (the recency effect). These 
two mechanisms combined would then explain the skewed distribution of choices we 
observed based exclusively on a combination of guessing and recency.  This hypothesis 
is further supported by the fact that observers are less confident in their response in the 
changing condition. By this account, thus, observers might not retain representations of 
the intermediate stages of the morph, but rather simply be more uncertain about what 
they have seen. Further research is clearly necessary to further explore this important 
issue. Nevertheless, regardless of which account is correct, our results indicate that 
observers unwittingly exposed to changing stimuli select what they think they have seen 
but (1) they do not choose at random and (2) their choices are made with lower 
confidence than in the static condition. It is striking that people’s choices can be different 
                                                
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this alternative account. 
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in the two conditions (static vs. changing) in spite of the fact that they all report identical 
subjective states with respect to change detection (i.e., all observers included in our 
analyses report not having perceived the change). 
 
Finally, we note that our findings are in line with Hollingworth and Henderson 
(2004)’s threshold model for the conscious detection of change. According to these 
authors, the visual system is continuously actively acquiring information about the world 
through fixations and saccades of the eyes, but also thanks to head and body movements. 
In this context, the visual system’s efficiency at detecting changes — surely one of its 
major functions — depends on its ability to filter out small internal errors. If our brain 
were to interpret any small discrepancy between two fixations as reflecting a change in 
the environment, there would be too many false alarms. For instance, if head and body 
movements were not perfectly compensated for during a blink, the visual system might 
attribute the resulting discrepancy to a change in the external world rather than to self-
generated movement. This is in fact what happens when one presses on one’s eyeball, so 
fooling the visual system into attributing the resulting changes to the external world 
rather than to the self-generated but highly unusual motion. A threshold system that 
requires that the difference between “views” reaches sufficient strength to cross a 
threshold allows the system to be resistant to such small internal errors. Gradual change 
stimuli fool the visual system into attributing subthreshold changes to internal error rather 
than to external events. This model thus suggests that the visual system actually detects 
small changes, but that such changes fail to be consciously represented as external 
changes and are hence dismissed. A threshold mechanism for change detection also 
 21 
explains why change blindness may occur despite accurate visual representations of the 
scene. Similar threshold accounts of change detection that might explain implicit change 
detection have already been suggested (Laloyaux et al., 2006) based on visual short term 
memory (VSTM) models that postulate noisy representations of the visual world 
(Baldassi & Burr, 2000; Wilken & Ma, 2004).  
 
To conclude, our results suggest that people’s representations of changing stimuli, 
as assessed through both a recognition task and through confidence judgments, is 
influenced by changing information in spite of the fact that people remained unaware that 
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Figure 1. Example of a scene used in this study in which all the pixels that change from 
Neutral to Emotional stimulus are highlighted. On average, the changing pixels 







Figure 2. Time course of a single trial of Experiment 2. Observers were first exposed to 
either a static or to a changing scene for 12 seconds. They were then exposed to a forced-






Figure 3. Sample stimuli and results of Experiment 2: Choice proportion for each morph 
presented in the forced choice recognition task for static and changing stimuli. The 
correct answer for static stimuli corresponded to the “0 – 100%” image. In half of the 
cases, an emotional picture had been presented, in the other half of the cases, a neutral 
picture had been presented. For the changing stimuli, the beginning of the movie is 
represented by “0 – 100%” and the end by “100 – 0%” on the X axis. There is thus no 
correct answer in the changing condition. In half of the cases, the facial expression of the 
target changed from emotional to neutral while in the remaining half, the facial 





Figure 4. Results of Experiment 2: Confidence ratings for the static and changing stimuli. 
Observers expressed their confidence on a scale from 1 to 4 (see main text). 
 
 
 
 
